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These are scarcely auspicious times for the left. An unforfunate
confluence of recent social and political trends has conspired to
question seriously the value of materialist interpretatians of the world.
The reconstruction of western societies out of the debris of the economic
crises of the nineteen seventies has led to the emergence of increasingly
intricate class hierarchies, Chonged work practices and accelerated
consumption have both served to blur the boundaries between
previously distinct social strata. The increasingly complex and dynamic
nature of contemporary bourgeois society has invited predictable and
indeed opportunistic responses from neoliberal critics. Most famously
the political scientist Francis Fukuyama (1989. 1992) has declared
tfiat we are living through tfie end of hisbry. The unprecedented
material weolth and optimal politicol freedom that global capitalism
hos allegedly afforded humanity have ensured, Fukuyama insists, that
the notion of social doss has effectively ceased fo have real meaning.
The Absence of Class Politics in
Northern Ireland
by Colin Coulter •
Introduction
Those commentators v^ h^o consider the social significance of class
to have declined substantially often make reference to the realm
of personal and political identity. The eminent sociologists
Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck have argued that people living
in contemporary society have increasingly come to transcend
the influence of social aggregates such as classes. Social actors
have apparently begun to dispense with traditional collective
identities in order to assemble their own distinctive personal
biographies out of the plentiful resources of everyday life. For
both Giddens (1994; 1998) and Beck (1992; 1994) the fluid social
relations that have arisen out of the process of globalisation offer
the conditions that promise to liberate the individual. The
principal authors of the brave new world of flexible accumulation
are no longer social classes but rather autonomous individuals.
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The tendency among social scientists to question the
salience of the role that class plays within contemporary society
is reflected in one of the most important recent analyses of the
'Northern Ireland problem'. In Explaining Northern Ireland
John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary offer an impressive
exploration of a range of competing interpretations of the
troubles. The authors are strongly critical of those readings
that have a materialist inflection. Interpretations of the troubles
that centre upon the concept of social class, McGarry and
O'Leary (1995: 152-61) assert, add little to our understanding
of the nature of the conflict within Northern Ireland. People
living in the province are considered to be animated principally
by those cultural identities and anxieties that are associated
with specific ethnonational communities. Preoccupation with
the material concerns of social classes, therefore, merely
distracts attention from the 'real' source of division within the
six counties.
The approach that McGarry and O'Leary adopt makes a great
deal of sense of course. Ethnonational sentiment does after all
exercise rather greater influence than class consciousness over
the outlook and conduct of those who reside within the six
counties. Nonetheless the reading of the 'Northern Ireland
problem' that the political scientists provide exhibits at least
two important shortcomings. Firstly, McGarry and OXeary
would seem to regard the political culture that obtains within the
six counties as essentially unidimensional. The interpretation
which they advance would appear to rest upon the assumption
that only that social identity that exercises greatest influence
over the political life of the province 'really' matters. Ethno-
national status evidently represents the principal source of
political allegiance within Northern Ireland. Those social
identities that attend class distinctions are, therefore, afforded
merely cursory acknowledgement.
The apparent unwillingness of McGarry and O'Leary to take
*'' • social class seriously constitutes an important flaw in their work.
While socio-economic status clearly represents a less important
source of political identity within the six counties than ethno-
religious affJiation it remains crucially significant nonetheless.
Sociai class exercises a palpable—if often unacknowledged—
influence upon the political culture that exists within the six
counties. Their understandable though ultimately debilitating
preoccupation with ethnonational distinctions blinds McGarry
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and O'Leary to the significance of the role that class divisions
play in the public life of Northern Ireland.
The second criticism that may be levelled at Explaining
Northern Ireland is rather more important. In spite of the title
which they chose to give to their book, McGarry and O'Leary
have a propensity to merely describe that which needs to be
explained. At various stages the authors attest that ethnonational
affiliation represents the predominant source of political identity
and division within Northern Ireland. The reader is never
provided, however, with an adequate interpretation as to why
precisely this may be so. In the absence of a persuasive
explanation we are left with the impression that the prevalence of
ethnonational sentiment within Northern Irish political life
should be considered inevitable, reasonable, 'natural* even.
The substance of the political culture that exists within the six
counties is of course rather more problematic than the silence
witbin McGarry and O'Leary's work would suggest. The
predominance of ethnonational sentiment within the public life
of the province is far from inevitable. Indeed there are substantial
grounds for the argument that social class rather than
ethnoreligious affiliation should be the principal author of
political belief and practice in Northern Ireland. Socio-economic
status certainly has rather greater bearing than ethnoreligious
distinction upon the distribution of essential life chances within
the six counties. Given the nature of the inequalities within
contemporary Northern Irish society one would not have to be
a raving reductionist to anticipate that social class might
constitute the most important source of political identity in the
province. In reality of course this is not the case. The political
culture that prevails within Northern Ireland flies in the face of
the material realities of existence in the six counties. That
ethnonational allegiance manages to exercise most influence
over the political life of the province should not, therefore, be
accepted on face value but rather should be acknowledged as a
problematic that demands proper explanation.
The purpose of this particular essay then is to resist an
essentially regressive trend within contemporary social science.
The discussion that follows sets out to illustrate that social class
has an enormous impact upon the manner in which Northern
Irish society is structured and experienced. Socio-economic
distinctions are clearly implicated in the ways in which the social
actors In the province think, feel and act. An appreciation of
80 - Capital & Class 1(69
the crucial role that social class plays in the lives of the residents
of the six counties should be considered essential, therefore, to
an adequate understanding of the nature of contemporary
Northern Irish society.
, • ; • • . . . : . • . • • • " ' •
The Salience of Social Class
The particular form of contemporary Northern Irish society has
arisen out of a specific and complex process of capitalist
development that has spanned the past couple of centuries.
Northern Ireland clearly exhibits all of the inequities and
disparities that are the classic hallmarks of bourgeois society
(Wilson, 1989: 13). The existence of substantial class divisions
within the six counties becomes readily apparent when we
consider the distribution of income within the province.
Information garnered by the British Treasury reveals that the
different social strata within Northern Ireland experience vastly
divergent life chances (Milburn, 1994). In 1994 the collective
earnings of the most affluent ten per cent of Northern Irish tax-
payers actually exceeded those of the least affluent fifty per cent.
The disparities in earnings that have always existed within the six
counties have become even more pronounced in recent decades.
The accession to power of Margaret Thatcher in the spring of
1979 heralded an era of growing inequality throughout the entire
United Kingdom. When the Conservatives entered office the
gap between rich and poor within Northern Ireland was already
enormous. During the fiscal year 1980/81 the most wealthy ten
per cent of the province's economically active population
received incomes that were on average eight times greater than
those of the least wealthy fifty per cent. With the passage of time
this particular ratio of inequality has grown appreciably. The
social and economic policies that were implemented by
successive Conservative administrations have ensured that the
void between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' within Northern
Irish society has widened alarmingly over the last generation. By
the tax year 1993/94 the top decile of wage earners in the
province had come to enjoy incomes that were on average
thirteen times larger than those received by the bottom half.
The information furnished by Her Majesty's Treasury reveals
Northern Ireland to be a society characterised by substantial
and growing material inequalities. The profoundly inequitable
The Absence of Class Politics in Northern Ireland 81
nature of the six counties finds further pertinent expression in
prevailing patterns of academic attainment. In contrast to some
other regions of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland has
retained a distinctly selective system of education. Northern
Irish children undertake standard intelligence tests around the
age of eleveti which determine the mode of secondary level
education that they will receive. Success in the eleven plus
examinations has an enormous bearing upon future academic
progress (Gallagher, 1995). Those youngsters who pass are
entitled to a place in one of the province's grammar schools.
These prestigious institutions frequently boast impressive
scholastic standards and routinely attain the best external
examination results in the United Kingdom. Northern Irish
grammar schools cater principally for the children of the
professional and business classes. Cormack and Osborne
(1995: 503) note that seven out of every ten pupils enrolled in the
province's grammar school network have parents engaged in
non-manual employment.
The majority of children who undertake the educational
transfer procedure in Northern Ireland do so unsuccessfully.
Those who fail the eleven plus examinations are educated in
secondary intermediate schools. These institutions are intended
to offer a general education to pupils deemed unsuited to
academic pursuits. Most of the children who attend secondary
intermediate schools are drawn from working class
communities. Cormack and Osborne calculate that two thirds of
pupils enrolled in secondary intermediates have parents
employed in manual labour. The resources that secondary
schools receive are merely a fraction of those lavished upon the
province's grammar schools (ibid: 513). The relative and
absolute underfunding that secondary schools have endured
has inevitably been mirrored in patterns of scholastic attainment.
While some secondary schools in the province have attained
respectable academic standards, many others remain extremely
poor. As a result, the proportion of Northern Irish teenagers
who leave school without any forma! qualifications runs high
relative to the United Kingdom average (ibid: 505-506;
Gallagher, 1995; Sheehan and Tomlinson, 1995).
The particular system of education that operates within the
province, therefore, radically differentiates pupils along socio-
economic lines. Children fi-om middle class backgrounds in the
main attend grammar schools that usually offer an excellent
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academic education. Working class pupils, in contrast, typically
go to secondary intermediates which frequently have poor
academic standards. The process of selection at work within the
province's education system clearly offers principal advantage to
the children of the professional and business classes. Northern
', Irish schools are, therefore, instrumental in reproducing the
enormous socio-economic disparities that obtain within the
six counties.
The distribution of life chances within the six counties
evidently and inevitably bears the inscription of social class.
Socio-economic status has also exercised an important influence
upon the manner in which the lamentable events that have
overtaken the province since the late sixties have been
experienced. The political violence that has marred recent
Northern Irish history has at one stage or another touched the
lives of most people who reside within the six counties (Ruane,
1996). The troubles have, however, impacted most gravely upon
the province's lower orders (Feldman, I99I). Most of those who
have played a direct role in the conflict have been drawn from
working class communities. The local security forces have
generally recruited from 'respectable' elements of the Protestant
working classes (Brewer and Magee, 1991). The agents of
unofficial forms of violence have also come overwhelmingly
from working class backgrounds. The research carried out by
Louise Shara (1994) indicates that almost all of those charged
with politically motivated offences are either unemployed or
engaged in semi-skilled or unskilled manual labour.
Most of the people who have killed during the modern
conflict in Northern Ireland have come from working class
backgrounds. So too have most of the people who have lost their
lives (Fay et al., 1999: 141-55). The significant absence of
. • appropriately detailed information means that it is difficult to
capture precisely the socio-economic characteristics of those
who have died during the troubles. We may nevertheless be able
to construct a reasonably accurate class profile of the victims of
political violence in Northern Ireland through examination of
the spatial distribution of fatalities. Adopting this approach bears
out anecdotal evidence that the political violence that has
overtaken Northern. Ireland since the late sixties has proved
particularly lethal for the residents of working class districts.
A decade ago Michael McKeown undertook the unenviable
task of analysing the two thousand seven hundred and sixty
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three deaths that had occurred during the opening twenty years
of the troubles. The information that McKeown (1989: 50)
presents clearly confirms that those regions of the six counties
that are materially disadvantaged have also experienced
disproportionately high levels of political violence. This
coincidence becomes especially evident when we examine the
electoral constituencies of North and West Belfast. While neither
district could be characterised as universally poor, both contain
some of the most extreme concentrations of poverty that exist in
Northern Ireland (Gaffikin and Morrissey, 1995: 53). The
inhabitants of North and West Belfast have endured rather
greater levels of political violence than those of any other part of
the province. Over the first two decades of the troubles the death
toll in each district was the strangely identical figure of five
hundred and forty four fatalities. The contrast with the most
affluent region of the six counties could hardly be more
dramatic. The residents of North Down have been relatively
sheltered from the conflict that has engulfed Northern Ireland
over recent generations. Between 1969 and 1989 the number of
residents of the province's 'gold coast' who lost their lives to
political violence was ihe remarkably small total of eight.
Class as a Social Identity
Even the necessarily cursory survey offered above confirms
contemporary Northern Irish society to be deeply differentiated
along class lines. The enormous inequalities that attend socio-
economic distinctions are clearly revealed in the patterns of
academic attainment and income distribution that obtain within
the six counties. Class position evidently exerts an important
influence over the allocation of life chances in Northern Ireland.
The salience of socio-economic status has not been lost upon the
citizens of the province. There exists ample evidence that social
class has considerable bearing upon the manner in which people
in Northern Ireland define both themselves and others.
The data yielded by large scale survey research suggests that
socio-economic status impinges strongly upon the
consciousness of social actors living in the six counties. People in
the province emerge as critically aware of the multiple
significance of class background. The consciousness of the
Northern Irish working classes would appear especially acute.
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Those annual surveys conducted under the auspices of the
British Social Attitudes project have consistently shown that
working class people in the province are overwhelmingly aware
of the material inequalities that mark the social order under
which they live (Hayes and McAUister, 1997). Around three
quarters of working class respondents have consistently
acknowledged that there exist iniquitous disparities in wealth
among the citizens of Northern Ireland (O'Dowd. 1991: 45).
Northern Irish people would seem strongly aware that class
origins are deeply implicated in the distribution of life chances
within the six counties. It scarcely comes as a surprise, therefore,
to learn that socio-economic status is crucial to the definitions of
self that social actors in the province construct. Surveys
conducted in the six counties have invariably revealed that people
are readily familiar with the systems of classification that are
associated with class distinctions. Northern Irish respondents
are typically willing and able to allocate themselves to specific
locations within the hierarchy of class relations. Indeed, people
living in the six counties often prove more capable of assigning
accurate class identities to themselves than citizens of other
countries conventionally assumed to possess more developed
systems of socio-economic distinction. The Northern Irish
working classes emerge as particularly familiar with the taxonomy
of bourgeois society. International data collated by Hayes and
McAllister (1995:356) reveals that working class residents of the
six counties are more likely to identiiy their socio-economic
status accurately than workers living in any other western state.
The responses that have been produced by surveys
conducted in Northern Ireland are perhaps significant. The
apparent familiarity of Northern Irish respondents with the
classifications associated with capitalist society suggests that
socio-economic status strongly informs the outlook of social
actors living in the region. Social class would seem to impinge
upon who and what the people of the province consider
themselves to be. Socioeconomic status influences not only how
Northern Irish people define themselves but also how they
regard others. The information that has emerged from the
annual British Social Attitudes survey intimates that class
generates feelings of solidarity among the residents of the six
counties. Two out ot every three respondents acknowledged
'feeling close' to others from similar socio-economic origins.
The sentiments of kinship that arise out of social class were of
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equal magnitude to those produced by ethnoreliglous identity
(Moxon-Browne, 1991:27).
The identities that people in Northern Ireland embrace
clearly bear the mark of socio-economic status. Social class
strongly influences the manner in which individuals understand
both themselves and others. The inhabitants of the six counties
possess an intimate knowledge of the specific ethnographic cues
that signify socio-economic distinction. While less extensive
and exotic than the markers of ethnoreligious persuasion, the
signifiers of class status constitute an important resource upon
which social actors draw in everyday situations. Accent, style
of dress, secondary level school attended, cultural appetites and
so on will alert individuals to the socio-economic origins of
those with whom they come into contact (Sennett and Cobb,
1972; Steedman, 1986). Awareness of the class background of
those one encounters may subtly alter the form of interaction.
Socio economic distinctions frequently give rise to strong
feelings of antipathy. Although less virulent than the hostility
that often emerges out of ethnoreligious conviction, the
prejudice associated with social class can often sour relations
and prevent specific forms of personal interaction. The strength
of ethnoreligious enmity within the six counties has served little
to dilute the snobbery which Northern Ireland shares in
common with other capitalist societies.
Class as a Political Identity
Examination of contemporary Northern Irish society attests to
the enormous significance of social class. Socio-economic
location evidently serves to determine the resources and
opportunities available to individuals. Social actors are keenly
aware that class status regulates the distribution of life chances
within the six counties. The class consciousness that informs
the outlook of people living in Northern Ireland would seem,
however, to have had little effect upon the political culture of the
province. The ideological formations that are prevalent within
the six counties would appear to arise not out of class sentiment
but rather out of ethnic or national feeling. It is, of course,
ethnonational status that fundamentally determines who social
actors in the province are willing to vote for, willing to talk to and
—in extreme circumstances—willing to kill.
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While ethnonational affiliation may well represent the
principal author of political identity in Northern Ireland it is,
however, by no means the only one. Ethnic or national sentiment
evidently define the parameters and contours of political life in
the province. Within the ideological framework that ethno-
national conviction has constructed, however, other forms of
social identity, and most notably those that emerge out of socio-
economic position, exercise a palpable influence (Hayes and
. - .. McAllister, 1997; McAuley, 1994: 2, 52, 124-9, 181; O'Dowd,
1990: 63). Social scientists and other commentators have often
been content to ignore the crucial role that social class plays in
• , the politicai culture of the province. The manner in which
ethnonational feeling and class sentiment interact to produce
political identity iti the six counties is equally apparent in the case
of both Irish nationalism and Ulster unionism. For reasons of
brevity tbe discussion tbat follows will address solely tlie former
ideological formation.
• i ' . ' '.
I ' •
Irish Nationalism - .
Those diverse individuals who belong to the nationalist tradition
within Northern Ireland share a profound sense of community
(Todd, 1990). The ideological and emotional bonds that exist
between nationalists living in the six counties are revealed and
strengthened during periods of political turmoil. The fateful
hunger strikes initiated in the early eighties managed to generate
sympathy even among Northern Irish Catholics sternly opposed
to the republican movement. The tense standoffs that have
developed at Drumcree over the last few summers offer more
recent evidence that nationalists of all backgrounds can at times
find comtnon political cause (Douds, 1996).
Even after the tumultuous events of the past three decades
nationalists living in the six counties still share many political
interests and grievances. The era of the troubles has nonetheless
- • recorded a substantial widening of traditional divisions among
nationalist ranks (Ruane and Todd, 1992:202-9). The ideological
fissures that have grown within Northern Irish nationalism have
acknowledged the changing class composition of the Catholic
community in the province. The introduction of'direct rule' in
the spring of 1972 initiated a sequence of processes that has
amplified existing socio-economic divisions among northern
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nationalists. A large section of the nationalist community has
derived enormous benefit from the policies that have been
implemented by various Westminster administrations (Shirlow
and McGovern, 1997: 193,197). The expansion of places in third
level education—coupled with the growing tendency of middle
class Protestants to opt for universities in Great Britain —has
enhanced the academic opportunities available to nationalist
youths. The creation of thousands of jobs in the public sector has
meant that many of the more able and ambitious members of the
current generation of nationalists have been able, unlike their
predecessors, to translate formidable academic attainment into
lucrative and secure employment (O'Connor, 1993: 14). Some
nationalists who bave been recruited into state institutions have
of course encountered obstacles that have impeded their career
development. The advances that members of the nationahst
community have secured through public employment remain
significant nonetheless.
The era of direct rule has offered many within the nationalist
community unprecedented opportunities for social mobility.
As certain Northern Irish Catholics have ascended the class
hierarchy a distance has opened up between themselves and
their fellow nationalists that is both social and spatial. Over time
burgeoning affluence has enabled many upwardly mobile
nationalists to move away from districts populated exclusively by ' '
their ethnopolitical kin. These changing patterns of residence
have assumed an especially significant form within the regional
capital. The district of south Belfast that centres upon the Malone
Road was historically the preserve of wealthy unionists. The few
Catholics who lived in the neighbourhood were usually servants
working in the sumptuous residences that characterise the area
(Sharrock, 1995). In recent times, however, the ethnoreligious
composition of Belfast's most exclusive district has undergone
remarkable change. Members of the new Catholic middle classes
have begun to acquire addresses along tbe Malone Road and its
numerous leafy arteries (Smyth, 1991: 144). Indeed there has
been some speculation that nationalists now outnumber
unionists among the residents of Belfast's most prestigious
neighbourhood (Brennock, 1991).
The shifting ethnoreligious credentials of those who live in
the leafy avenues of south Belfast provides an important
illustration of the gains that many Northern Trish nationalists
have made over the last couple of decades. The benefits that
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direct rule has bestowed upon the nationalist community have,
however, been far from universal. The policies that Westminster
has implemented have enhanced the opportunities for wealth
and social mobility of some northern nationalists. Others within
the nationalist fold have proved rather less fortunate.
The series of economic and political crises that have befallen
Northern Ireland over recent generations have impacted with
especial severity upon sections of the nationalist working
classes. Unemployment represents a particular problem for
working ciass Catholics and, more specifically, for working class
Catholic men. Tbe decline of the construction industry has
eroded further the employment opportunities available to
working class nationalists who have invariably proved either
unwilling or unable to seek work within the greatly expanded
security sector. As a consequence, working class Catholic men
tend to be heavily over-represented among the ranks of the
province's unemployed. Indeed nationalist males are presently
more than twice as likely as their unionist counterparts to be
out of work. This particular index of the inequalities that exist
between the principal ethnoreligious communities in Northern
Ireland has altered little since the early nineteen seventies
(Aunger, 1975; O'Dowd. 1995:154-5). , •
The greater likelihood that nationalists will find themselves
out of work is captured in the spatial distribution of unemploy-
ment within the six counties. Those parts of Northern Ireland that
exhibit exceptionally high levels of joblessness are invariably
populated primarily by nationalists (Sheehan and Tomlinson,
1995). Tbe alarming unemployment rates that exist in districts
such as west Belfast, Strabane, the city side of Derry and so forth
ensure that the Catholic working classes are particularly likely to
experience low income, poverty and reliance upon state agencies.
The disadvantage and dependence that characterise the position
of many working class nationalists become apparent when we
consider the distribution of a specific welfare benefit within the six
counties. School dinners are supplied free to children whose
parents are unemployed and receiving income support from the
state. A report published in the mid nineties reveals that the
recipients of this particular welfare provision tend to be
concentrated heavily in Catholic schools (McGill, 1995). The
document in question notes that some thirty five per cent of
Catholic pupils are entitled to receive free dinners compared to
only fifteen per cent of their Protestant counterparts.
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The violence of the last three decades has been especially
traumatic for the nationalist working classes. The enormous
resources of the British military have been deployed in the main
to regulate and repress working class nationalist communities.
The coercive conduct of the security forces has ranged from the
routinised attrition of multiple forms of surveillance to the
murder of unarmed political demonstrators. Hence, while the
British state may frequently relate the nationalist middle classes
as a generous benefactor it often relates to working class
nationalists as a tireless oppressor. Working class Catholics have
also been the principal victims of that violence that has
originated within the loyalist community. Remarkably few of
the nationalists who have been murdered by loyalist
paramilitaries in the course of the troubles have belonged to the
republican movement. Between 1969 and 1993 loyalists
murdered sixty four people who could be considered republican
activists. During the same period six hundred and seventy
nationalists who had no formal association with the republican
movement lost their lives at the hands of loyalist paramilitaries
(McGarryandO'Leary, 1995:160). Most ofthe nationalists who
have died as a result of unofficial violence have been drawn from
working class neighbourhoods. The composition of nationalist
fatalities during the troubles reveals that the principal victims of
loyalist paramilitarism have been randomly selected members of
the Catholic working classes. The indiscriminate nature of
loyalist violence has meant that every resident of certain working
class nationalist districts is—in principle at least—at risk.
Consequently the strategy that loyalist paramilitary factions have
adopted has tended to spread fear throughout entire working
class Catholic communities.
The interests and experiences of the class fragments that
comprise the 'nationalist community' have, therefore, diverged
considerably since the introduction of direct rule. The process
of class polarisation at work among Northern Irish nationalists
has inevitably produced and reproduced ideological divisions
which have come to be indexed, albeit crudely, in patterns of
electoral allegiance (Ruane and Todd, 1992:206-7; 1996:71-4,
166-70). The socio-economic profiles of those who support
the two largest nationalist political parties within the six
counties are rather different (Irvin and Moxon-Browne, 1989;
Ryan, 1994: 66). While the Social Democrat and Labour Party
(SDLP) attracts votes from many working class nationalists, •
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the electoral strength of the party stems primarily from its
enduring appeal among the Catholic middle classes (Evans and
Duffy, 1997:58-9). The approach that the SDLP has advocated
has been that of edging towards a united Ireland through a
gradual and inclusive process of political and cultural dialogue.
The political strategy endorsed by the party would seem to have
chimed with the interests and ambitions of middle class
nationalists (Mitchell, 1991: 346; O'Connor, 1993: 35, 43, 49,
52-3). The promotion ofthe ideal of a united Ireland clearly
accords with the deep sense of Irishness that persists among
upwardly mobile Catholics living in the six counties. At the
same time, the pursuit of that particular ideal through a political
strategy that is distinctly gradualist serves to accommodate the
instrumental concerns of those nationalists who are fearful that
radical change will erode the substantial material gains that
have been secured under the auspices of direct rule.
The electoral constituency which Sinn Fein draws upon
differs somewhat. Since its re-emergence in the early nineteen
eighties Sinn Fein has operated primarily as the voice of the
more marginalised elements among the nationahst working
classes (Evans and Duffy, 1997: 72; Irvin and Moxon-Browne,
1989) The political wing ofthe republican movement has
conventionally advocated terminating the Union through force
of arms. This radical strategy would seem to have appealed to
many of those working class Catholics who have enjoyed few of
the economic advantages that have flowed from direct rule and
who have had to bear the brunt ofthe habitual repression meted
out by agents ofthe state.
During the present decade the radicalism of Sinn Fein has
- ' • waned demonstrably. The political goal ofthe republican
movement remains of course the establishment of a unitary Irish
state. In recent years, however, many republicans have come to
the realisation that the creation of a united Irelatid will occur
neither in the immediate future nor indeed through force of
arms (Shirlow and McGovern, 1998). The growing circum-
spection of Sinn Fein would also appear to have altered the
outlook ofthe party on social and economic matters. Through
an extensive network of grassroots organisations republicans
continue to seek to represent and advance the interests ofthe
nationalist working classes. The references to socialism that once
informed the discourse of Sinn Fdn have, however, all but
disappeared.
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The process of revision that Sinn F^in has undergone in
recent years would seem to have broadened considerably the
appeal of the party. The numerous elections that have
punctuated the evolution ofthe 'peace process' have witnessed
increases in the republican vote that few observers would have
anticipated. The electoral advances that Sinn F^in has secured
lately may perhaps reflect the growing attraction that the party
exercises among middle class nationalists. Having apparently
embraced at least the essence ofthe prevailing neoliberal
orthodoxy on economic affairs contemporary republicanism
could hardly be considered a threat to the appreciable material
interests ofthe new nationalist middle classes. The movement of
Sinn Fein towards a strategy o f unarmed struggle', moreover,
has probably appealed to those upwardly mobile Catholics who
consider the SDLP to be insufficiently resolute but who have
been unwilling to shoulder the moral responsibility associated
with political violence. The growing popularity of Sinn Fein
among the nationalist middle classes was illustrated in a
particular triumph during the 1997 local government elections.
In north Belfast the party polled well as anticipated in the
traditional fastness of the working class New Lodge district.
Rather less expected were the many votes that Sinn Fein received
from middie class nationalists living in the tree-lined avenues
that side the lower stretches ofthe Antrim Road. The electoral
advances that Sinn Fein made in north Belfast were crowned
when the party captured a seat in the affluent Castle ward.
Why Ethnonational Rather Than Class Politics?
The political culture that obtains within Northern Ireland
accommodates a range of social interests and identities. In
particular the public life ofthe province acknowledges the
complex interplay of those political personae that arise out of
socio-economic status and ethnonational distinction
respectively. The crucial interchange that conjoins class
sentiment on the one hand and ethnic or national feeling on the
other does not, however, represent a relationship between
equals. On the contrary in fact. Within the incessant dialogue
that takes place between class consciousness and ethnonational
orientation it is the latter that invariably speaks with the louder
voice and that almost always has the last word.' >
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The predominance of ethnic and national affiliation as
sources of political identity within Northern Ireland is in some
respects perplexing. Ethnonational status certainly has an
enormous impact upon the experiences and opportunities of
social actors living in the six counties {O'Dowd et al., 1980). It is
entirely fitting, therefore, that the political life ofthe province
should bear the indelible impression of ethnic and national
sentiment. While ethnonational affiliation profoundly affects
, . the lives of people in Northern Ireland, its significance remains
nonetheless subordinate to that of social class. Socio-economic
Status exercises rather greater influence than ethnic or national
identity over the distribution of life chances within the six
counties. Whether people are working class or middle class is
simply more important than whether they are Protestants or
Catholics when it comes to whether they will secure
employment, the nature ofthe job they will get, the standard of
education they will receive, the type of schools their children
will attend, how long they will live (Kilbane, 1995), whether or
not they will be killed or injured as a result of politically
motivated violence and so on.
Examination of the massive inequalities that blight
contemporary Northern Irish society suggests that social class
possesses rather greater material significance than ethnicity or
^ " nationality. In most respects the Protestant and Catholic
working classes have substantially more in common with one
another than with their more privileged ethnonational kin.
Moreover, the survey data presented earlier would indicate that
working class people living in the province who come trom
different ethnoreligious backgrounds often have a strong
appreciation of their mutual material interests. The class
consciousness that would seem prevalent within Northern
Ireland has, however, had only limited impact upon the political
life ofthe province. Socio-economic status represents a strictly
secondary source of political identity within the six counties.
While the political alliances forged within the province routinely
transcend class barriers only rarely do they supersede
ethnoreligious distinctions. The inability of social class to
displace ethnonational affiliation as the principal author of
political belief and practice within Northern Ireland may be
explained in at least two ways.
Firstly, the pre-eminence of ethnoreligious sentiment within
the political culture of the province may be attributed to the
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machinations of certain influential players within the six counties.
Those resilient ethnic divisions that characterise the region have
often served handsomely the particular interests of the more
elevated strata within Northern Irish society. Preoccupation with
the 'imagined communities' ofthe ethnie or nation has typically
ensured that the working classes within the six counties have
failed to act upon their critical understanding ofthe interests
and grievances that they share. The prevalence of ethnic
sentiment within the province has, therefore, served to dissipate
the forces of social radicalism. Those who have derived greatest
benefit from the bourgeois social formation that exists within
Northern Ireland have inevitably—and with some success —
sought to encourage ethnoreligious feeling. The more privileged
elements of the unionist community have proved particularly
adept at fomenting ethnic division among the working classes.
For most of this century Ulster unionism was under the
control of capitalists and large landowners. Those powerful .
interests that dominated unionist politics until the outbreak of
the present troubles were evidently concerned to retain the
allegiance ofthe Protestant working classes. Prominent unionist
politicians routinely employed a populist discourse that centred
upon Protestant supremacism. Furthermore, the leadership of
the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) was anxious to be seen to be " .
taking on board the interests and grievances of working class
loyalists. As the First World War came to a close many •
Protestant workers became heavily involved in a spate of
important industrial disputes. Those wealthy men at the helm of
Ulster unionism quickly moved to stem the seemingly rising
tide of proletarian radicalism. In 1918 the Ulster Unionist
Labour Association (UULA) was formed {Collins, 1994: 145-6).
Over the next half century the UULA provided a channel
through which representatives ofthe unionist working classes
were assigned to the lesser positions within Stormont
administrations (Bewet al, 1979: 48-9). The association would
appear to have performed with considerable success the role for
which it was designed. During the period of devolved
government at Stormont there were a few occasions when the
unionist working classes sought to pursue those substantial
interests held in common with Catholic workers. In the main,
however, working class Protestants proved content to exist as
subordinates within the unionist class alliance. When the
unionist working classes eventually did turn resolutely against
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the Stormont regime they did so for reasons that owed more to
ethnoreligious prejudice than proletarian solidarity.
: The concern of the leaders of unionism to maintain the
support of working ciass Protestants has found a further, more
contemporary, illustration. In 1995 various individuals who were
broadly sympathetic to the British Labour Party and who
belonged mainly to the UUP came together to form a political
pressure group. The formal purpose behind the establishment ot
this Labour grouping was to provide a voice to those who did not
share the conventional conservatism of mainstream unionism
with regard to social and economic matters. The creation ofthe
pressure group may also be interpreted as an attempt to fend off
growing competition for the electoral allegiance ofthe unionist
working classes. In recent years the smaller loyalist parties—and
in particular the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP)—have begun
to highlight and promote the particular and abundant concerns
ofworking class Protestants (Finlayson, 1999:90;McAu!ey, 1997:
165-9). The formation ofa Labour grouping broadly within the
orbit of the UUP constitutes a measure designed to prevent
support haemorrhaging to the 'fringe' loyalists. The existence of
the coalition suggests that the interests of the Protestant lower
orders are being advanced within the unionist mainstream. In
reality, however, the creation of a Labour chapter represents
merely another empty cynical gesture on the part of a political
party that has consistently abused and ignored the unionist
working classes.
Examination of pertinent developments within unionism
over the course ofthe twentieth century reveals the ability ofa
social and political elite within the six counties to regulate and
reproduce ethnonational division. Those privileged men who
have traditionally run unionism have consistently sought to
encourage the Protestant lower orders to believe that their true
interests lie with their ethnoreligious kin rather than their
nationalist fellow workers. Their efforts have clearly borne fruit.
The enmities that fester among the province's working classes
offer lucid testimony to the machiavellian skill ofthe most
elevated strata within Northern Irish society.
Secondly, the substance ofthe political culture that prevails
within Northern Ireland may be attributed to the particular
discursive forms that arise out of ethnic feeling and class
sentiment respectively. Those ideological formations that emerge
from ethnic and national identities often have a merely tenuous
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relationship with historical and contemporary realities,
intellectuals, artists and others who strive to promote the
interests of ethnonational communities are at times economical
with the truth. Those stories that testily to the glory ofthe nation
or ethnie frequently have little or no basis in fact. That the
dominant narratives of the ethnonational tradition may be
erroneous does not of course diminish their appeal. Social actors
have consistently proved willing and able to cling to tales and
beliefs long since debunked by the academy. The emotional
power that defines ethnic and national identities derives largely
from the rich figurative systems that they produce. The existence
and value ofthe ethnonational community are vividly articulated
through anthems, flags and emblems that stir the blood of those
within and without the laager.
The distinctive symbolic systems that actualise the nation
and ethnie are routinely able to reduce people to tears or move
them to violence. Socio-economic status rarely seems capable of
generating a comparable emotionai charge. In part this is
because ofthe particular form of political discourse that arises
out of social class. Those social actors who seek to advance
specific class interests —or at least those ofthe lower orders—
tend to possess a relatively faithful disposition to the 'truth'.
Representatives ofthe working classes will typicaliy be concerned
to outline the 'simple facts' concerning the inequities and
divisions that are the hallmark of capitalist society. Statistics
that illustrate unemployment, low income and poor housing
wiii often produce feelings of outrage. The narratives ofworking
class existence that these data advance simply cannot, however,
match the frequently altogether more fantastic tales that
delineate the supposed experience ofthe nation or ethnie.
Socio-economic status rarely enjoys an affective power
comparable to that of ethnicity or nationalism largely because it
fails to produce an equally potent symbolic programme. All
social classes as a matter of course construct distinctive systems
of cultural representation and distinction. Working class
communities constantly produce and reproduce a collection of
stories, songs and images that recount their specific experience.
The cultural texts that are generated by social classes tend,
however, to exercise a lesser appeal than those that originate
within the nation or ethnie. It is 'the Sash' or 'the Soldiers' Song'
rather than 'the Internationale' that brings tears to the eyes of
working class men as the end of licensing hours beckons.
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The nation and ethnie have, therefore, come to represent the
principal authors of political allegiance within the six counties
due largely to their ability to produce particularly persuasive
discursive forms. Ethnonational distinctions provide the essence
ofthe province's political culture not because they are the most
important source of inequality in Northern Ireiand. Socio-
economic status has an altogether more substantial bearing upon
the iniquitous distribution of iife chances within the six counties.
Ethnonational communities have managed to lay stronger
claims than social classes to the political loyalties of people living
in Northern Ireland not because they have greater material
significance but rather because they tell better stories.
Conclusion •'
As we face into a new century there are many people living in
Northern Ireland who harbour a sense of optimism that wouid
have been inconceivabie only a few years ago. The political
compromise thrashed out at Stormont in the spring of 1998
would seem to mark a dramatic turn in the fortunes ofthe
province. In certain regards the Good Friday Agreement wouid
appear to hoid out the prospect of real political progress within
the six counties {O'Leary, 1999). The implementation ofthe
Accord wouid mean an end to the brutal campaigns of vioience
sustained by ioyalist and repubiican paramilitaries alike over
the last three decades. Working ciass men wouid cease to kili and
maim other working ciass men in the name of competing though
equally worthless nationaiisms. That wouid of course be a turn of
events genuinely worth ceiebrating.
The orchestrated euphoria that has attended recent poiitical
developments in Northern ireiand should not, however, be
allowed to cloud our critical judgement. Aimost inevitabiy, the
Belfast Agreement exhibits traits that are thoroughiy objection-
able, not least to socialists. The tone ofthe document frequently
seems to exude a sense of pluralism. In reality though the Good
Friday Agreement rests upon an understanding of the nature
of contemporary Northern Irish society that turns out to be
oppressively narrow. Within the text the residents of the
province are constructed purely as representatives of one or
other ofthe ethnonationai traditions prevaient within the six
counties. Under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement the
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people of Northern Ireiand are entitled soiely to be unionists or
nationalists. The prospect that sociai actors in the province
might prefer to construct themselves in terms of gender,
sexuality, age or more individuated inciinations is biithely
ignored. The most important distinctions that exist in Northern
Ireland or any other bourgeois society—namely those that
pertain to class—are simpiy written out of existence.
The architects of the Belfast Agreement evidently presume
that those ethnonational programmes that have plagued
Northern Ireiand over recent generations wiii continue to
consume the poiitical iife ofthe province for the foreseeabie
tuture. These presumptions will aimost inevitabiy come to
assume the status ofa self-fulfiiling prophecy. The impuises that
inform the Good Friday Agreement seek not to bury unionism
and nationalism but rather to praise them. The deal brokered at
Stormont signals that substantial material and figurative resources
will he employed in order to confer legitimacy upon morally
bankrupt political ideologies that have nothing to ofter the people
of Ireland, north or south, other than yet more misery. The
ethnonational reaction that gnaws at its heart reveals the Belfast
Agreement as an enterprise that has neither the ability nor indeed
the intention of creating a just and progressive society on the
island. The need for class politics remains as pressing as ever.
1. The sovereignty that ethnonalional feeling frequently exercises over class Note
sentiment was perhaps iliuslrated with greatest clarity during one ofthe most
important early passages ofthe troubles. In the spring of 1974 the ramshackle
Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) organised an industrial stoppage that
would eventually prove enormously effective (Anderson, 1994; Nelson,
1984:155-60). The success ofthe strike revealed ihe considerable influence
al the disposal of sections ofthe Northern Irish working classes. This power
was, however, used not to advance the interests of workers but rather to
prosecute regressive ethnonational concerns. The reactionary events of
May 1974 merely confirm that the most squalid versions of elhnonationalism ,
are al times able to appropriate the language and form of class politics.
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